A languages structure and grammatic rules can distort how we interpret and percieve reality 🧠
In considering that language can be seen as a kind of metaphor, more subtle issues arise when we consider the structure of a system of metaphors interlinked with the grammatical rules of a language. Descartes, who tried to doubt everything, or at least says he tried, found that he could not doubt the proposition “i think therefor i am.” He could not doubt that proposition because he only knew Indo-European languages, and It is an Indo-European linguistic convention that a verb must be preceded by a substanative noun—that an action must be attributed to some allegedly isolated and reified actor. It is this convention that is the reason why we still say “it is raining” even though we no longer believe in Zeus or any other rain god and would be hard put to say what else “it” might refer to.
These linguistic structural factors may explain some of the great internal conflicts within philosophy. If Descartes were to think in a French that was even more latinate than todays, he would percieve “un pomme grosse et rouge” and conclude that the mind starts with general ideas and then determines paticulars. Whereas John Locke, thinking in english, would percieve an object such as “a big red apple” and deduct that the mind starts from particulars and then assembles general ideas.
References
- Wilson, A., Robert (1986). The New Inquisition Chapter 1 Models, Metaphors, and Idols (Page 26 · Location 416). Grand Junction, Colorado: Hilaritas Press
Metadata
Type:🔴 Tags: Psychology / Linguistics / Semantics / Philosophy / Epistemology Status:☀️