Each perception that we make is best considered to be a gamble rather than a certaintyđ§
In existentialist and humanist modelsâmodels influenced by the thought and experiments of researchers such as Maslow, Sullivan, Ames, Perls, Leary, Krippner, and many othersâthe human being is seen as both in-DIVIDE-ual and in-UNITE-ual, separated in some ways but connected with all things in other ways.
Because perception is not absolute, all of our ideas are somewhat conjectural and inferential. Therefor, according to existential-humanist psychology, where the materialist says âI perceive,â It would be more correct to say âI am making a bet.â Concretely, in the cock-eyed room, we make a bets that we are seeing something familiar to us. If allowed in the room and asked to touch a corner of the ceiling with a pointer, we quickly realize the gamble in every act of perception. Typically, we would hit everything but the corners in our attemptsâthe walls, other parts of the ceiling, etc. A strange thing occurs when we go on trying. Our perceptions changeâwe are making a series of bets, one after anotherâand gradually we are able to find the corner we are aiming for.
The same sort of thing happens in any psychedelic drug experience, which is why existentialist-humanist models became more popular with psychologists after the 1960s. It also occurs through mindfulness practiceâclearing the mind of its habitsâand that is why so many psychologists of this tradition have been involved in researching what happens, physiologically, to those who practice mindfulness. Both involve the deactivation of the default mode network, which is involved in predictive coding.
When we return to the ordinary world of social interactions after such shocks as the cock-eyed room, psychedelics, or mindfulness, we observe that the same processes are going on in others. People are making bets about which model fits best at a given time, but they are not aware of making these bets, since the brainâs perceptual systems actively and pre-consciously interpret and edit their input. If the models do not fit very well, they do not revise them but instead grow angry at the world for being the culprit. Most typically, they find someone to blame because the more certain of our views we become, the more we perceive ourselves to be victims of an impersonal world.
References
- Wilson, A., Robert. (1986). The New Inquisition Irrational Rationalism and the Citadel of Science Chapter 8 Creative Agnosticism (Page 250 ¡ Location 5267). Grand Junction, Colorado: Hilaritas Press.
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Type:đ´ Tags: Psychology / Philosophy / Epistemology Status:âď¸